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Article 4

Prosecutorial Discretion i n a n
Adversary System
Kenneth J. Melilli*
I was a prosecutor for nearly five
and quite
possibly, nothing else I ever do will so neatly define who I am
in the eyes of others. Many students, colleagues, neighbors and
others that I encounter have a n unwarranted confidence that
they understand my politics, ethics, ambitions and personality
based upon little more than the fact that I once held this
seemingly telling p o ~ i t i o n . ~
I have often resisted, and sometimes even resented, this
stereotype. In fairness, however, I must confess that I
identified myself, at least professionally, as a prosecutor. I did
not consider myself a lawyer as such; lawyers were people who
represented specific clients. I viewed myself as having a very
different role, a view shared by many of my prosecutor
colleagues. My understanding was that my obligation as a
prosecutor was to the public interest, a n obligation
fundamentally different than that of lawyers to their private
clients.
Moreover, my image of the prosecutorial function was
developed even before I became a prosecutor. At least in my
case, my view of a prosecutor as one not obliged to the interests
of a particular client was precisely what initially attracted me
to the profession. Like many of my fellow law students, and
* Professor of Law, Albany Law School of Union University. I gratehlly
acknowledge the contributions of Suzi McClosky, Maureen Sladek, and, in
particular, Patricia Taylor.
1. From September 1982 through March 1986, I was an Assistant United
States Attorney in the District of Columbia. From April 1986 through May 1987, I
was an Assistant United States Attorney in Vermont.
2.
This is not to suggest that there has been any consensus among people as
to the specific politics, ethics, ambitions and character traits of prosecutors. It is
merely to suggest that the idea of a "prosecutor" seems to carry with it a much
more personal definition than a host of other occupations, including the more
generic identification of an individual as a lawyer.

670

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I992

like many of my own students today,3 I had some personal
reservations about my role as a lawyer in a n adversarial
system of dispute resolution. Consequently, I regarded the
special obligation of prosecutors to "seek justice'" not as a n
additional burden, but rather as the fundamental attraction of
the position. I viewed the obligation to "seek justice" as a
liberation from the uneasy commitment to private interests
inherent in the "ordinary" practice of law.5
No doubt, people choose to become prosecutors for a variety
and combination of reason^.^ There are very few, if any,
comparable opportunities for relatively novice lawyers to gain
valuable and marketable courtroom experience. For many, that
experience is foreseen as challenging and enjoyable. For some,
the position offers a degree of prestige and future political
opportunity. Some-fortunately a very few in my experience-are driven by an overzealous and insatiable desire to
rescue the world from criminals. But what may be surprising to
the reader unfamiliar with prosecutors is that many arrive at
the position motivated, a t least in part, by disaffection for the
"hired gun" model of private law practice. Indeed, I was by no
means alone in my ambition to prosecute a s a means of
accomplishing a n objectively different, and subjectively
superior, code of conduct. Moreover, my guess is that many
current fledgling and hopeful prosecutors will find a familiar
chord in the above refrain.

3.
See Lon L. Fuller & John D. Randall, Professional Responsibility: Report of
the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1159 (1958).
4.
MODELCODEOF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITYEC 7-13 (1983) [hereinafter
MODELCODE]. See also MODELRULESOF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 3.8 cmt.
(1991) [hereinafter MODELRULES].
5.
Because the prosecutor has no identifiable client, he or she must make
decisions ordinarily made bjr the client. John S. Edwards, Professional
Responsibilities of the Federal Prosecutor, 17 U. RICH. L. REV. 511, 513 (1983);
John Kaplan, The Prosecutorial Discretion-A Comment, 60 NW. U. L. REV. 174,
180 11.15 (1965). But, in the words of former Associate Attorney General Stephen
Trott:
I can't think of a better job than to be a prosecutor. It's an absolutely
amazing opportunity. It's a luxury of a lifetime to be able to pursue only
those things that are right. You are unencumbered by the bad ideas of a
client who is paying you money. You are only encumbered by your own
desire to do the right thing and to make sure that justice is done.
Stephen Trott, Address to J. Frank Coakley National Symposium on Crime (May
1987), quoted in JOHN
J. DOUGLASS,
ETMCALISSUESIN PROSECUTION
31 (1988).
6.
See George T. Felkenes, The Prosecutor: A Look at Reality, 7 SW. U. L.
REV. 98, 99 (1975).
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Is there some point to this monologue other than personal
remembrances or soulful comradery? I think there is. In fact, I
believe the way prosecutors view their roles in the adversary
system provides the most useful tool for unraveling the difficult
and perplexing problem of prosecutorial ethics.
The purpose of this article is to examine the prosecutorial
function from the perspective of the prosecutor. The specific
context for this examination will be the prosecutor's charging
decision, which is the most significant aspect of the
prosecutorial function. The issue is whether, and to what
extent, a prosecutor's personal assessment of a defendant's
&t
should affect those charging decisions. The article
examines the extent to which the model of all lawyers as
adversaries for the interests of their clients does, and should,
influence a prosecutor's charging decision.
Part I of the article explores the need for prosecutorial
charging discretion, the nature and extent of that discretion,
and the various existing external constraints upon that
discretion. Part I1 compares various self-imposed standards for
the exercise of that discretion. Part I11 investigates
institutional and other factors affecting the prosecutor's
exercise of charging discretion. Part IV then examines the
impact of the adversary model of lawyer behavior upon the
prosecutorial charging function. Finally, Part V offers
recommendations for prosecutorial standards in the exercise of
charging discretion.

The decision to charge an individual with a crime is the
most important function exercised by a prosecutor. No
government official can effect a greater influence over a citizen
than the prosecutor who charges that citizen with a crime.' In
many cases, the prosecutor determines the fate of those
ac~used,~
at least in those cases where the evidence or
statutory sentencing structure renders the ultimate outcome of
Even when the
the prosecution largely a foregone conclu~ion.~

FUNCTION
2 (1982);
7. DAVIDM. NISSMAN& ED HAGEN,THE PROSECUTION
Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY
3 (1940).
8. James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARv. L. REV.
1521, 1522 (1981) [hereinafter Vorenberg I].
9. Id. at 1525-26.
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criminal charge does not result in conviction, the mere filing of
a criminal charge can have a devastating effect upon an
individual's life,'' including potential pretrial incarceration,"
loss of employment,12 embarrassment and loss of
reputation,13 the financial cost of a criminal defense,14 and
the emotional stress and anxiety incident to awaiting a final
disposition of the charges.15 Such consequences may well have
a permanent effect that is not cured even by an acquittal a t
trial.16As a consequence, many prosecutors do, and all should,
regard the possibility of charging an innocent person as "the
single most frightening aspect of the prosecutor's job."17
In exercising the charging function, the prosecutor enjoys
broad, indeed virtually unlimited, discretion.'' Indeed, the
prosecutor has been fairly described "as the single most
powerful figure in the administration of criminal justi~e."'~
The prosecutor determines not only which cases and
defendants to prosecute2' but also which charges to bring?
NISSMAN& HAGEN,supra note 7, a t 13.
10.
11. FRANK
W. MILLER, PROSECUTION:
THE DECISION TO CHARGEA SUSPECT
WITH A CRIME 3 (1969); Stanley Z. Fisher, I n Search of the Virtuous Prosecutor: A
Conceptual Framework, 15 AM. J. CRIM. L. 197, 232 n.152 (1988).
12.
MONROEH. FREEDMAN,LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 84
(1975) [hereinafter FREEDMANI]; MONROEH. FREEDMAN,
UNDERSTANDING
LAWYERS'
111; Fisher, supra note 11, at 232 n.152.
ETHICS218 (1990) [hereinafter FREEDMAN
KENNETHC. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY
JUSTICE:
A PRELIMINARY
INQUIRY190
13.
(1969); FREEDMANI, supra note 12, a t 84; FREEDMANU, supra note 12, a t 218;
MILLER,supra note 11, at 3; Fisher, supra note 11, at 232 n.152; Vorenberg I,
supra note 8, at 1525.
FREEDMANI, supra note 12, a t 84; FREEDMAN
11, supra note 12, at 218;
14.
MILLER, supra note 11, at 3; Fisher, supra note 11, at 232 n.152; Vorenberg I,
supra note 8, at 1525.
FREEDMANI, supra note 12, a t 84; FREEDMAN11, supm note 12, at 218;
15.
Fisher, supra note 11, at 232 n.152; Vorenberg I, supra note 8, a t 1525.
K e ~ e t hE. North, Policy Guidelines-Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 15
16.
132, 133 (1979).
THE PROSECUTOR
17.
NISSMAN& HAGEN,supra note 7, at 13.
18.
See, e.g., Pugach v. Klein, 193 F. Supp. 630, 634 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); NATIONAL
DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS'N, THE PROSECUTOR'SSCREENING FUNCTION:CASE
EVALUATION
AND CONTROL5 (1973); Charles P. Bubany & Frank F. Skillern,
Taming the Dragon: An Administrative Law for Prosecutorial Decision Making, 13
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 473, 474 (1976); Sarah J. Cox, Prosecutorial Discretion: An
Overview, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 383, 418 (1976); Vorenberg I, supra note 8, a t
1525; James Vorenberg, Narrowing the Discretion of Criminal Justice Officials,
1976 DUKE L.J. 651, 678 [hereinafter Vorenberg 111.
19.
Bubany & Skillern, supra note 18, at 477.
Id. at 476.
20.
21.
Id. a t 480-81. This decision may be of greater practical significance than
t h e decision to charge. For example, i t may be a foregone conclusion that a n
individual who sells controlled substances to an undercover officer will be

6691

PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION

673

The prosecutor generally retains the discretion to revisit the
initial charging decision, either by reinstating voluntarily
dismissed charges o r by dismissing or altering previous
charges.22A decision not to prosecute, or to dismiss a pending
prosecution, may be made even in the face of sufficient
And indeed, a substantial percentage
evidence for con~iction.~~
of arrests results in either declined or voluntarily aborted
prosecution^.^^ The extent of this discretion has been
described as "the central issue today" in the American criminal
justice system.25
Some authors have charged that the concentration of
discretionary power in the prosecutor is ~ n n e c e s s a r y , ~ ~
"resulting from default rather than a conscious legislative
judgment."27 Some have opined that charging decisions-particularly decisions not to prosecute-are sometimes
made for political, personal or other capricious reason^.^' As a
result, there is a growing demand for some limitation upon
~~
prosecutorial discreti~n;~either by l e g i s l a t i ~ n , adminisor centralized decision-making within the
trative reg~lation,~'
prosecuted. But the decision to charge the offense as either a felony sale or a
misdemeanor possession, perhaps based upon the quantity of drugs involved, may
be of terrific consequence to the defendant in terms of likely punishment.
Id. at 478. Although office policies may determine charging decisions to a
22.
degree, individual prosecutors also exercise considerable discretion in the cases
assigned to their personal attention. Fisher, supra note 11, a t 205, 255. I n some
cases, individual prosecutors in nonsupervisory positions may possess and exercise
authority to charge or dismiss individual cases. Even when the formal authority to
charge or dismiss is limited to prosecutors in supervisory positions, however, line
assistants still can exercise great influence upon those decisions by virtue of their
superior familiarity with the cases assigned to their individual caseloads.
23.
Wayne R. LaFave, The Prosecutor's Discretion in the United States, 18 AM.
J. COMP.L. 532 (1970).
24.
Cox, supra note 18, a t 392.
25.
Jack M. Kress, Progress and Prosecution, 423 ANNALSAM. ACAD. POL. &
SOC. SCI. 99, 109 (1976).
26.
DAVIS,supra note 13, at 222.
27.
Vorenberg 11, supra note 18, at 680.
28.
DAVIS,supra note 13, at 224.
29.
DAVIS,supra note 13, at 165, 216-17; DOUGLASS,
supra note 5, a t 226-27;
Bubany & Skillern, supra note 18, at 490.
30.
See, e.g., Vorenberg 11, supra note 18, a t 680-81. Professor Vorenberg offers
the possibility of legislation requiring prosecutors to charge the most serious
offense supported by probable cause, although he acknowledges that it would be
unrealistic to expect such legislation in the short run, and allows for the possibility
that there may be some circumstances where some discretion should be permitted.
31.
See, e.g., Ernest van den Haag, Limiting Plea Bargaining and Prosecutorial
Discretion, 15 CUMB.L. REV. 1, 19 (1984). Dr. van den Haag proposes a rule
requiring prosecutors to bring all charges where there is or likely will be sufficient
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prosecutorial agency.s2
Nevertheless, the notion of broad, prosecutorial charging
discretion enjoys much support.3s significantly curtailing
prosecutorial discretion would accomplish consistency at the
cost of individualized justicees4 If discretion t o charge is
justified, then that justification necessarily extends to the
discretion not to charge.35 And that discretion justifies not
only eliminating unprovable casess6 but also protecting
citizens from charges that do not advance societal interest^.^'
Whatever disagreement exists about the appropriate extent
of prosecutorial discretion, there is a consensus that some
degree of discretion is ine~itable.~'To some extent, this
consensus is born from a recognition that the resources of the
criminal justice system do not permit the prosecution of all
offenders.3g More significantly, even. those who would limit
prosecutorial discretion do not generally target prosecutorial
assessment of the nature and strength of the evidenceO4O
Within the broad notion of prosecutorial discretion, a
distinction must be made between factors that lend themselves
t o some degree of systematization and those that do not.41The
former category focuses upon offenses generally, such as
prosecutorial decisions not to enforce anachronistic penal laws
like adultery, or decisions to charge felony sales of small
quantities of controlled substances as misdemeanor
possessions. The latter category would include case-specific

evidence to make conviction possible, with a possible exception for cases that
cannot lead to prison sentences.
32.
See, e.g., North, supra note 16, at 133 (calling for the establishment of
uniform charging policies within a prosecutorial agency).
33.
See, e.g., Pugach v. Klein, 193 F. Supp. 630, 635 (S.D.N.Y.1961); Charles
D. Breitel, Controls in Criminal Law Enforcement, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 427, 427
(1960); Note, Nonfeasance: A Threat to the Prosecutors' Discretion, 30 IND.L.J. 74,
78-79 (1954).
34.
Norman Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial
Discretion, 19 UCLA L. REV. 1, 5 (1971).
35.
Breitel, supra note 33, at 430.
36.
Note, supra note 33, at 76.
37.
Cf. Fisher, supra note 11, at 231-32.
See, e.g., DAVIS,
38.
supra note 13, at 195; DOUGLASS,supm note 5, at 2;
Breitel, supra note 33, at 427.
39.
Jackson, supra note 7, at 5; North, supra note 16, at 133.
40.
See Vorenberg I, supra note 8, at 1547.
41.
See genemlly, Abrams, supra note 34, at 11; Charles W. Thomas & W.
Anthony Fitch, Prosecutorial Decision Making, 13 AM. CRIM.L. REV. 507, 513-17
(1976) (classifying fadors which influence charging decisions as objective or
subjective).

6691

PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION

675

factors, such as the quantity and quality of the evidence of
guilt. There is no serious quarrel with the proposition that a
prosecutor must engage in such case-specific eval~ations,4~
and most would agree that these evaluations require that the
prosecutor make some factual findings:3 including, in many
cases, assessments of the credibility of witnessed4 It is this
latter category of discretion, or case-specific assessment, with
which we are here concerned. And there can be no serious
dispute that this type of discretion is not only inevitable, but
also desirable.45
The desirability of case-specific evaluations by prosecutors
becomes clearer when one considers that the alternative is not
a system without discretion, but rather a system in which casespecific discretion is abdicated entirely to the police. Police
officers have discretion to arrest or not to arrest:6 and the
exercise of that discretion enjoys a good measure of public
They may warn for minor
expectation and support!7
infraction^.^^ Even in serious cases, police officers sometimes
evaluate the credibility of witnesses in exercising their
d i s ~ r e t i o n .Police
~ ~ officers are selective, not only in making
arrests, but also in determining where to devote limited

42.
See, e.g., MILLER,supra note 11, at 34.
43.
See Fisher, supra note 11, a t 229-30.
H. Richard Uviller, The Unworthy Victim: Police Discretion in the Credibility
44.
Call, LAW& CONTEMP.
PROBS., Autumn 1984, a t 15, 31.
45.
Those who criticize American prosecutors as possessing unnecessary
discretion frequently point to their German counterparts as a model of a more
desirable system "where the discretionary power of prosecutors is so slight as to be
almost nonexistent." DAVIS,supra note 13, a t 224. See also id. at 191-95. It is true
that the German prosecutor theoretically has no discretion and is compelled by law
to prosecute all offenders (with certain limited exceptions). Klaus Sessar,
Prosecutorial Discretion in Germany, in THE PROSECUTOR
255, 255-57 (William F.
McDonald ed., 11 Sage Criminal Justice System Annuals, 1979). However, there is
considerably more discretion-at least in the case-specific evaluation sense of that
term-in practice than in theory. Id. a t 262. German prosecutors do dismiss cases
for insufficient evidence, id. at 264, and German prosecutors use problems of proof
to create charging discretion, id. a t 272.
46.
DAVIS,supra note 13, a t 18, 81-83; Joseph Goldstein, Police Discretion Not
to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low Visibility Decisions in the Administration of
Justice, 69 YALEL.J. 543 (1960); LaFave, supra note 23, a t 532 n.2; Note, supra
note 33, a t 75.
47.
Uviller, supra note 44, a t 28; Gregory H. Williams, Police Discretion: The
Institutional Dilemma-Who Is in Charge?, 68 IOWAL. REV. 431, 432 (1983); Note,
supra note 33, a t 75.
48.
Goldstein, supra note 46, at 559 11.27.
49.
Uviller, supra note 44, at 28.
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investigative resources,50 and these decisions are not normally
controlled by the prosec~tor.~'
Obviously, potential prosecutions screened out by police
decisions not to investigate or not to arrest will ordinarily
receive no review by the prosecutor's office.52 But the cases
which the police bring to the prosecutor--either in the form of
a completed arrest, a n application for an arrest warrant, or a
request for a grand jury investigation-will ordinarily receive
some degree of independent scrutiny by the prosecutor. If that
independent scrutiny does not take place-either because of
some external or self-imposed limitation on the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion-then
the decision to charge will
effectively have been made solely by the police.
Nevertheless, there are prosecutors who do not recognize
the power to, or necessity for, reviewing police charging
decisions.53 In some cases, prosecutors rely upon the arrest
warrant, the grand jury or the preliminary hearing as a
~ ~ of
substitute for their own case-specific e ~ a l u a t i o n .None
these procedures, however, provides a sigdicant check upon
the prosecutor's decision to charge, and consequently, none
provides any justification for the prosecutor's abdication or
deference to the case-specific discretion of police officers.
The arrest warrant55 is obtained by an ex parte
application to the court. Generally, the decision to issue the
warrant is based solely on the affidavit of a police officer, and
the court does not make any further inquiry of the officer a t
the time the warrant is issued. Moreover, when the officer is
not an actual witness to the crime, the officer's affidavit simply
relays information from others whose credibility has been
evaluated, if at all, by the officer.56 The warrant is issued
upon the minimal standard of "probable cause" that a crime

50.
Id. at 15; Breitel, supra note 33, at 429.
supra note 5, at 157.
51.
DOUGLASS,
BRIANA. GROSMAN,
THE FQOSECUTOR:AN INQUIRY INTO THE EXERCISEOF
52.
DISCRETION
44 (1969); Abrams, supra note 34, at 2 n.4; Goldstein, supra note 46,
at 543; LaFave, supra note 23, at 532 n.2.
53.
JOAN E. JACOBY,THE PROSECUTOR'SCHARGINGDECISION:A POLICY
PERSPECTIVE15 (1977).
Id.
54.
55.
Most arrests do not require a warrant. See United States v. Watson, 423
U.S. 411 (1976). Most arrests are, in fact, made without an arrest warrant. WAYNE
R. LAFAVE& JEROLDH. ISRAEL,CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE
141-44 (1985).
See Abraham S. Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of
56.
Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALEL.J. 1149, 1164 (1960).

6691

PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION

677

has been committed and that the individual named in the
warrant committed it.57The issuance of the arrest warrant,
then, is hardly a significant check upon the police officer's
judgment or the prosecutor's acquiescence theretoes8
Likewise, the grand jury is not a significant check on the
prosecutor's, or police officer's, decision to charge. Only about
one-half of the states require a grand jury indictment, and even
that requirement is generally limited to fe10nies.~'The grand
jury process is ex parte and entirely controlled by the
prosecutor, trial rules of evidence are not generally applicable,
and the standard is, again, merely probable cause.60For these
reasons, the grand jury offers little, if anything, in the way of a
screening mechanism on prosecution^,^^ and is frequently
referred to is a "rubber stamp" of the prose~utor.~~
The preliminary hearing .exists in most statesa3 and, in
contrast with the grand jury, is a judicial proceeding in which
the defense participates. Nevertheless, the minimal standard of
probable cause is routinely and easily met by the
g o ~ e r n m e n t .Moreover,
~~
where a grand jury indictment is
available and returned prior to the date of the preliminary
hearing, the preliminary hearing is generally u n a ~ a i l a b l e . ~ ~
For these reasons, the preliminary hearing, like the arrest
warrant and grand jury indictment, cannot be regarded as a
significant check on the prosecutor's charging di~cretion.~~
57.
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964). This evidentiary standard is less
exacting than the "preponderance of evidence" standard applicable to most civil
cases, CHARLESH. WHITEBREAD
& CHRISTOPHER
SLOBOGIN,
CRIMINALPROCEDURE
4 3.03 (2d ed. 1986), and has been described by the United States Supreme Court
as a "substantial chance" or "fair probability" of criminal activity. Illinois v. Gates,
462 U.S. 213, 244 n.13, 246 (1983).
58.
Cf. Goldstein, supra note 56, a t 1164-65.
59.
1 SARAS. BEALE& WILLIAMC. BRYSON,GRANDJURY
LAW & PRACTICE
$ 2.03 (Cum. Supp. 1991); DAVID W. NEUBAUER, AMERICA'S COURTS AND THE
CRIMINAL
JUSTICE
SYSTEM201 (2d ed. 1984).
60.
See, e.g., George T. Frampton, Jr., Some Practical and Ethical Problems of
Prosecuting Public Officials, 36 M D . L. REV. 5, 19 (1976); Vorenberg I, supra note
8, at 1537-38.
61.
Goldstein, supra note 56, a t 1171; Vorenberg I, supra note 8, a t 1537-38,
1556.
62.
Bubany & Skillern, supra note 18, at 483-84; Frampton, supra note 60, a t
6; Kaplan, supra note 5, at 177; Vorenberg 11, supra note 18, a t 678,
63.
See Goldstein, supra note 56, a t 1169 n.57.
64.
Goldstein, supra note 56, at 1166, 1183; Vorenberg I, supra note 8, a t 1538.
65.
Bubany & Skillern, supra note 18, a t 483-84; James R. Kavanaugh,
Representing the People of Illinois: Prosecutorial Power and Its Limitations, 27
DEPAULL. REV. 625, 636 (1978).
66.
Bubany & Skillern, supra note 18, a t 483-84; Goldstein, supra note 56, a t
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Indeed, as long as the government meets the probable
cause threshold, there is essentially no judicial review of the
prosecutor's charging decision.67 Consequently, in most cases
the trial itself is the only significant, formal stage of the
process that protects the erroneously accused? By that point,
of course, many of the incidents of suffering the formal criminal
accusation are irreparable.69Therefore, a prosecutor who fails
to exercise case-specific charging discretion is, a t least
potentially, permitting the defendant to be brought to trial on
either the decision of a police officer or, even more alarmingly,
on the accusation of an individual from whom the police officer
merely takes a report.
In the absence of any significant limitations within the
criminal justice system upon prosecutors' exercise or abdication
of their discretionary authority, one might expect to find more
significant restraints in the ethical rules governing prosecutors'
conduct. As a general proposition, however, the rules of ethical
conduct for prosecutors' charging decisions require no more
than the same minimalistic "probable cause" required by the
criminal, adjudicative process.70
Virtually every state has adopted, as its standard of
professional responsibility for lawyers, some variation of either
the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional
Conduct or the American Bar Association Model Code of
. ~ ' Model Code, which was
Professional R e ~ ~ o n s i b i l i t ~The
1168-69, 1172; Vorenberg I, supra note 8, at 1556.
67.
See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978); Powell v.
Katzenbach, 359 F.2d 234, 235 (D.C. Cir. 1965); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d
167, 171 (5th Cir. 1965); Pugach v. Klein, 193 F. Supp. 630, 634 (S.DM.Y. 1961);
State ex rel. Kurkierewicz v. Cannon, 166 N.W.2d 255, 260 (Wis. 1969). See also
DOUGLASS,supra note 5, at 2; Kress, supra note 25, a t 114. The usual reasons
Aven for this hands-off approach is the constitutional notion of separation of
powers, see, e.g., Cox, 342 F.2d a t 171-72; Pzlgach, 193 F. Supp. at 634; Philip J.
Cardinale & Steven Feldman, The Federal Courts and the Right to
Nondiscriminatory Administration of the Criminal Law: A Critical View, 29
SYRACUSE L. REV. 659, 689 (1978); Cox, supra note 18, a t 394, the peculiarly
executive function of weighing factors such a s the allocation of prosecutorial
resources, see, e.g., Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 480-81 (D.C. Cir.
1967), and avoidance of deterring prosecutorial beneficence, Cardinale & Feldmdn,
supra, a t 690. Judicial review of prosecutorial charging discretion is generally
limited to those cases in which the defendant can show that criminal charges were
brought on the basis of some impermissible discrimination, such a s race, gender or
religion. Vorenberg I, supm note 8, a t 1540; Vorenberg 11, supra note 18, at 679.
68.
Goldstein, supra note 56, at 1172; Vorenberg I, supra note 8, a t 1523.
69.
See supra text accompanying notes 10-16.
70.
See Frampton, supra note 60, a t 19-20.
71.
REPORTERON LEGAL ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL
See generally NATIONAL

PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION
adopted by the American Bar Association in 1 9 6 9 , ~is~ divided
into three sections: canons, ethical considerations and
disciplinary rules. Only the disciplinary rules are intended to
be mandatory, as the first two categories are intended to be
aspirational only.73 The relevant disciplinary rule prohibits
prosecutors from instituting criminal charges which they know
or should know are not based upon probable cause.74 The
relevant aspirational pronouncement of the Model Code is less
precise, encouraging prosecutors to "seek justice."75 This
admonition appears throughout ethical codes of conduct,76
case
and ~ornrnentary,~~
but is nowhere clearly defined.79
RESPONSIBILITY
(University Publications of America 1991).
72.
John F. Sutton, Jr., How Vulnerable Is the Code of Professional
Responsibility?, 57 N.C. L. REV. 497, 497 (1979).
See MODELCODE,supra note 4, Preliminary Statement. See also Geoffrey
73.
C. Hazard, Jr., Legal Ethics: Legal Rules and Professional Aspirations, 30 CLEV.
ST. L. REV. 571, 572 (1982); Sutton, supra note 72, at 514. This distinction has not
always been 'followed in practice, a problem which the American Bar Association
(ABA) hoped to remedy with the subsequent adoption of the Model Rules. Hazard,
supra, a t 573-74; James H. Stark, Review Essay, The Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, 12 CONN.L. REV. 948, 953, 958 (1980). The Model Rules, i n contrast to
the Model Code, speak in terms of mandatory rules, with accompanying
commentary. Hazard, supra, at 574.
"A public prosecutor or other government lawyer shall not institute or cause
74.
to be instituted criminal charges when he knows or it is obvious that the charges
are not supported by probable cause." MODELCODE,supra note 4, DR 7-103(A).
75. The responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from that of the usual
advocate; his duty is to seek justice, not merely to convict. This special
duty exists because: (1) the prosecutor represents the sovereign and
therefore should use restraint in the discretionary exercise of
governmental powers, such as in the selection of cases to prosecute; (2)
during trial the prosecutor is not only an advocate but he also may make
decisions normally made by an individual client, and those affecting the
public interest should be fair to all; and (3) in our system of criminal
justice the accused is to be given the benefit of all reasonable doubts.
MODELCODE,supra note 4, EC 7-13.
76.
See, e.g., MODELRULES,supra note 4, Rule 3.8 cmt. ("A prosecutor has the
responsibility of a minister of justice . . . ."); I STANDARDS
FOR CRIMINALJUSTICE
Standard 3-l.l(c) (Am. Bar Ass'n, 2d ed. 1980) ("The duty of the prosecutor is to
seek justice, not merely to convict.") [hereinafter ABA ~OSECUTION
STANDARDS];
ETHICS, Canon 5 (Am. Bar Ass'n 1908) ("The primary
CANONSOF PROFESSIONAL
duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is not to convict, but to see that
justice is done.").
77.
See, e.g., United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 696 (1985); Berger v.
United States, 295 US. 78, 88 (1935).
78.
CONST.L.Q.
See Carol A. Corrigan, On Prosecutorial Ethics, 13 HASTINGS
537, 537-38 (1986); Edwards, supra note 5, a t 511; Felkenes, supra note 6, at 109;
Fisher, supra note 11, at 219; H. Richard Uviller, The Advocate, the Truth, and
Judicial Hackles: A Reaction to Judge Frankel's Idea, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1067,
1070 (1975).
79.
Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice:
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Although the Model Rules are generally regarded as
reflecting a certain distrust of the adversary system and a
desire to restrain the zeal of attorney advocate^,^^^ the only
limitation the Rules place on prosecutors' charging discretion
continues to be the familiar, and unimposing, probable cause
standard." The ABA Prosecution Standards, which have been
adopted in many jurisdiction^,^^ do permit prosecutors to take
into consideration their reasonable doubt about the defendant's
actual
and do recommend charging based on sufficient
admissible evidence t o support a con~iction.~~
However, like
the Model Code and Model Rules, the Prosecution Standards
only sanction charges known not t o be supported by probable
cause?
An ethical prerequisite of probable cause is essentially
meaningless. Probable cause is little more than heightened

Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND.L. REV. 45, 46 (1991). Not surprisingly, this
nebulous admonition is not a n independent basis for disciplinary action. See Fisher,
supra note 11, a t 218-19.
See Stark, supra note 73, a t 965, 972.
80.
"The prosecutor in a criminal case shall: (a) refrain from prosecuting a
81.
charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause . . ." MODEL
RULES,supra note 4, Rule 3.8(a). See also FREEDMAN
11, supra note 12, a t 222. If
anything, the Model Rules formulation appears to sound a retreat from the Model
Code limitation. A violation of Rule 3.8 of the Model Rules appears to require
actual knowledge of the absence of probable cause, while DR 7-103(A) of the Model
Code appears to allow disciplinary action on the basis of the constructive
knowledge of the prosecutor in some instances. See supra note 74. Charging
someone with a criminal violation solely for the purpose of harassment is so
manifestly improper that it need hardly be mentioned. DOUGLASS,supra note 5, a t
235; MILLER,supra note 11, a t 43. A rule that proscribes only charging with the
knowledge that probable cause is absent is little more than a restatement of the
unremarkable prohibition of charging solely for the purpose of harassment.
82.
See MODELRULES,supra note 4, Rule 3.8 cmt.
"Illustrative of the factors which the prosecutor may properly consider in
83.
exercising his or her discretion are: (i) the prosecutor's reasonable doubt that the
STANDARDS,
supra note 76,
accused is in fact guilty . . . ." ABA PROSECUTION
Standard 3-3.903).
"A prosecutor should not institute, cause to be instituted, or permit the
84.
continued pendency of criminal charges in the absence of sufficient admissible
evidence to support a conviction." ABA PROSECUTION
STANDARDS,
supra note 76,
Standard 3-3.9(a).
85.
"It is unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor to institute, or cause to be
instituted, or to permit the continued pendency of criminal charges when it is
known that the charges are not supported by probable cause." ABA PROSECUTION
supra note 76, Standard 3-3.9(a).
STANDARDS,
For a further discussion of the three-tiered standard of the ABA Prosecution
I, supra note 12, at 86; FREEDMAN
11, supra note 12, a t
Standards, see FREEDMAN
222; H. Richard Uviller, The Virtuous Prosecutor in Quest of an Ethical Standard:
Guidance from the ABA, 7 1 MICH. L. REV. 1145, 1155-56 (1973).

.
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suspicion, and it is not even remotely sufficient to screen out
individuals who are factually not g ~ i l t y . 'More
~
importantly,
the criminal justice system itself provides for an early finding
of probable cause," thus allowing the ministerial prosecutor
to avoid any caseapecific evaluation, abdicating both to the
antecedent judgment of the police officer and the subsequent
determination of the court or the grand jury.
The recommended threshold of the ABA Prosecution
Standards-sufficient
admissible evidence to support a
conviction-is likewise far too easily satisfied to provide any
real limitation upon, or incentive to exercise, case-specific
evaluation by the prosecutor. The standard is essentially that
of a prima facie case, i.e., evidence sufficient to survive a
motion for a judgment of acquittal at the end of the
government's case." Not only does that standard fail to
require the prosecutor to consider defenses known to the
prosecutor,89 but it also fails to require the prosecutor to
evaluate witness credibility. Instead, the prosecutor is merely
required to evaluate whether the government's evidence, if
accepted, establishes the elements of the charged offense.g0
Motions for judgments of acquittal are rarely successful,g1and
an equivalent ethical standard falls far short of preventing the
prosecution of cases that should not, or even cannot, result in
Other charging standards, lacking the external
enforcement mechanisms of the professional responsibility

See FREEDMAN
I, supra note 12, a t 85; Frampton, supra note 60, a t 19;
86.
Frank J. Rernington & Wayne A. Logan, Frank Miller and the Decision to
Prosecute, 69 WASH.U. L.Q. 159, 169 (1991).
87.
If the process is initiated by an arrest warrant or a n indictment, then the
court or the grand jury, respectively, will have determined. probable cause prior to
the defendant's arrest or summons. In any event, if the defendant is to be held
beyond the initial appearance, there must be a judicial determination of probable
cause. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975).
88.
Uviller, supra note 85, at 1156.
89.
Frampton, supra note 60, a t 20.
90.
Uviller, supra note 85, a t 1156. On a motion for judgment of acquittal, the
court must deny the motion if a rational jury could find the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. In ruling on the motion, the court must draw all
reasonable inferences, and resolve all credibility disputes, in favor of the
government. See, e.g., Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U S . 307, 319 (1979). Consequently,
a prosecutor who self-imposes that same standard assumes that the government's
evidence is accurate and uncontested.
91.
Cf. Kaplan, supra note 5, a t 183.
92.
FREEDMAN
I, supra note 12, a t 86; Kaplan, supra note 5, at 183.
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codes, are also available to the prosecutor. The National
District Attorneys Association has adopted essentially the same
standards as those found in the ABA Prosecution standard^.'^
They recommend that a prosecutor file only charges which can
be substantiated by admissible evidence a t trial,g4 and list
"[dloubt as to the accused's guilt" as a "factor[] which may be
c ~ n s i d e r e d . "The
~ ~ United States Department of Justice has
issued standards requiring that a federal prosecutor go forward
with a prosecution only when "the admissible evidence will
probably be sufficient to obtain and sustain a convi~tion."~~
The commentary equates this standard with that necessary t o
survive a motion for judgment of acquittal:? the same
standard discussed above.98
One thing is clear from an examination of these standards.
While Due Process requires that a conviction must be based
upon proof beyond a reasonable doubtPg there is no
comparable degree of certainty required of prosecutor^.'^^
Instead, the ethical rules, which focus upon the morality of the
private practitioner,lO' and which do not distinguish
prosecutors from the ordinary model of zealous advocacy,102
have settled upon the virtually meaningless requirement of
probable cause. This may be more dangerous than no standard
a t all. If a prosecutor can find no internal ethical command, he
or she may adopt the ethical minimum of probable cause as the
only morality for exercising charging discretion.lo3

I t is questionable whether professional disciplinary rules

See DOUGLASS,
supra note 5, a t 28.
93.
NATIONAL DIST. AlTORNEXS ASS'N, NATIONALPI30SECUTION STANDARDS
94.
5 43.3 (2d ed. 1991). See also FREEDMAN
11, supra note 12, a t 222.
S
NATIONALPROSECUTIONSTANDARDS
95.
NATIONALDIST. A ~ R N E Y ASS'N,
fj 42.3(a) (2d ed. 1991).
96.
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,PRINCIPLES
OF FEDERALPROSECUTION
pt. B.2 (1980).
See also Edwards, supra note 5, a t 519.
OF FEDERALPROSECUTION
pt. B.2 cmt.
97.
U.S. DEF'T OF JUSTICE,PRINCIPLES
(1980).
See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
98.
99.
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 US. 307, 316 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,
364 (1970).
100.
MILLER,supra note 11, a t 22; Kavanaugh, supra note 65, at 633.
101.
DOUGLASS,
supra note 5, a t 33-34.
102.
Zacharias, supra note 79, a t 52.
Id. at 103.
103.
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influence the behavior of lawyers to any significant degree?
Such rules are infrequently and lightly enforced,'" and they
are perceived in some quarters as merely aspirational and not
mandatory.lo6Moreover, the requirements of such rules are
generally not burdensome, as the drafters of disciplinary rules
have historically been cautious in their approaches.lO' As a
result, some lawyers set for themselves ethical standards more
demanding than those required by disciplinary rules.lo8
Prosecutors, too, are likely uninfluenced in their charging
decisions by external ethical constraints. Prosecutors are rarely
disciplined for violating rules of professional responsibility.log
Beyond the barely meaningful requirement of probable cause,
the ethical rules and court decisions are too general to provide
limits or guidance.l1° As a consequence, charging and other
decisions must be made by pr&ecutors on the basis of
"personal standards of integrity and fairness.""'
Even within the prosecutors' office, charging policies tend
to have little impact on the case-specific evaluations
undertaken by individual line assistants. Office charging
policies tend to focus on offense categories rather than the
quantitative and qualitative evaluations of evidence in
individual cases.'" Office guidelines tend to be broad and
flexible, in part to avoid defense motions claiming violations of
internal g~idelines."~Finally, decisions by prosecutors,
including decisions to commence or continue criminal
prosecutions, must often be made spontaneously and
instinctively with infrequent opportunities for serious internal
review.l14

104. Murray L. Schwartz, The Death and Regeneration of Ethics, 1980 AM. B.
FOUND.RES. J. 953, 958.
105. Richard L. Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?, 59 TEX. L.
REV. 639, 648-49 (1981).
106.
See L. Ray Patterson, A Preliminary Rationalization of the Law of Legal
Ethics, 57 N.C. L. REV. 519, 521 (1979).
107. See Charles Frankel, Code of Professional Responsibility, 43 U. CHI. L. REV.
874, 874-75 (1976) (review).
108. See Schwartz, supra note 104, a t 959.
109.
FREEDMANI, supra note 12, at 96. I t is not even clear that federal
prosecutors are subject to discipline for violation of state ethical rules. Zacharias,
supra note 79, a t 106 & n.252.
110. Fisher, supra note 11, at 212; Frampton, supra note 60, at 8.
111. Edwards, supra note 5, a t 514.
112.
Cf. Bubany & Skillern, supra note 18, at 488-89.
113. Vorenberg 11, supra note 18, a t 680.
114. Cf. DOUGLASS,
supra note 5, a t 33.
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Clearly, then, so much responsibility is vested in the hands
of the individual prosecutor that much of the success of the
criminal justice system depends upon the quality and integrity
of prosecutor^."^ Specifically, the key is the individual
prosecutor's perception of his o r her professional role,
particularly in the context of the charging decision.ll6
Most prosecutors are, in fact, attentive to the ethical
appropriateness of their behavior117 and, in particular,
concerned about the fairness of their charging decision^."^
Nevertheless, in describing how prosecutors view their
professional roles,'19 including the standards used in the
exercise of their charging d i s c r e t i ~ n , 'few
~ ~ generlizations are
safe. "Prosecutors areneither homogenous [*]or fungible," and
consequently, differences exist both among offices and among
individuals within the same office.lZ1
All prosecutors agree, as they must,'" that probable
cause is required in pursuing criminal charges.lZ3 Many
prosecutors impose a higher standard of probability upon their
charging decisions,'% but not all agree they should do so.'"
As a general rule, prosecutors also require, a t least a t some
point prior to trial, that the government's evidence be sufficient
to survive a motion for judgment of acquittal.lZ6Furthermore,
virtually all prosecutors require, a t least at the time of trial,
that the government's case present a reasonable likelihood of
conviction. lZ7
That prosecutors impose upon themselves a "reasonable
See Benjamin R. Civiletti, Preface to U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,PRINCIPLESOF
115.
FEDERALPROSECUTION
(1980); Felkenes, supra note 6, at 98; Jackson, supra note
7, at 6.
116.
See JACOBY,supra note 53, at 15; Pamela J. Utz, l b o Models of
99 (William F. McDonald ed., 11
Prosecutorial Professionalism, in THE PROSECUTOR
Sage Criminal Justice System Annuals, 1979).
117.
See DOUGLASS,supra note 5, a t vi.
118.
See Felkenes, supra note 6, at 109.
119.
Fisher, supra note 11, at 214.
120.
See Samuel R. Gross, Loss of Innocence: Eyewitness Identification and Proof
of Guilt, 16 J. LEGALSTUD. 395, 445 (1987); Utz, supra note 116, at 103.
121.
DOUGLASS,
supra note 5, a t 1.
122.
See supra text accompanying notes 70-87.
123.
See NISSMAN& HAGEN,supra note 7, a t 13.
124.
MILLER,supra note 11, a t 34.
125.
Cf Martin H. Belsky, On Becoming a n d Being a Prosecutor, 78 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1485, 1517-18 (1984) (review essay).
126.
See Kaplan, supra note 5, at 182. See also Kavanaugh, supra note 65, at
634-35.
127.
MILLER,supra note 11, a t 35.
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likelihood of conviction" standard is entirely unremarkable.
Given limited resources and full, if not burgeoning, caseloads,
there is simply no practical and legitimate reason for a
prosecutor t o proceed to trial in a case that has no reasonable
prospect of resulting in a conviction. Thus, as a purely tactical
matter, prosecutors will not proceed, to trial a t least, with
cases presenting no reasonable likelihood of convi~tion.'~~
The truly ethical question is presented by a case where,
despite evidence presenting a reasonable likelihood of
conviction, the prosecutor has some doubt as to the actual guilt
of the defendant. Some prosecutors present such cases to the
jury at trial, due either to an unwillingness to act on their
personal judgment or a belief that they are not permitted t o do
so.'" Others refuse to seek convictions in such cases,
requiring, in addition to a convictable case, that they be
personally satisfied of the defendant's guilt.130Indeed; some
prosecutors require that they be convinced to the same extent
that the law requires for the jury to return a guilty verdict, i.e.,
beyond a reasonable doubt.lsl
The ultimate issue addressed in this article-whether
prosecutors should incorporate their personal judgments as to
defendants' guilt into their charging decisions-is a question
which will be further examined in Parts N and V of this
article. Before doing so, however, it will be useful to examine
certain factors which affect prosecutors7charging decisions and
consequently impact the resolution of that ultimate issue.

American lawyers are predisposed to be zealous
advocates.ls2 Trial lawyers in particular tend to target
128. Id.; Kaplan, supra note 5, a t 180.
129. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U .
CHI. L. REV. 50, 63 (1968); Fisher, supra note 11, a t 229-30; Gross, supra note
120, at 445.
130. MILLER,supra note 11, a t 36 n.15, 42; Corrigan, supra note 78, a t 539;
Kaplan, supra note 5, a t 178. See also Bubany & Skillern, supra note 18, at 479.
For a recommendation that ethical codes be revised to require prosecutors to have
a good faith belief in the factual guilt of the defendant, see Zacharias, supra note
79, a t 49-50.
131.
MILLER,supra note 11, a t 22; Utz, supra note 116, a t 110. Cf. NISSMAN&
HAGEN,supra note 7, a t 13.
1 GEOFFREYC. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, !L'HE LAW OF
132.
A HANDBOOKON THE MODELRULESOF PROFESSIONALCONDUCT
327-28
LAWYERING:
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"victory" as their goal.ls3 And young lawyers tend to
assimilate these values for a variety of reasons.
Law schools generally emphasize litigation, creating a
focus on victory a s a professional goal? Law school training
in professional responsibility tends, quite understandably, to
focus upon the private p r a ~ t i t i o n e r , ' ~whose
obligation, in
~
significant part, is to zealous advocacy on behalf of the
particular client.ls6 As a general proposition, the adversary
model is not the subject of a great deal of formal scrutiny.137
Law students who are suspicious of the adversary system often
shed their reservations,'" either before or shortly after
entering practice. The transition from law school to practice
often parallels the adoption of the perspective of a n advocate
unconcerned about the discovery of truth.lsg Litigators in
particular may become "amoral technician[s] committed to
winning the adversary battle."140
I t is with this indoctrination that many individuals enter
into service as prosecutors. Many of these individuals are
young, inexperienced, and little-prepared for the responsibility
of exercising charging discretion.141 When they arrive, they
are provided with some degree of training in adversarial skills
and general office policies, but they are given little if any
education in prosecutorial ethics and the exercise of casespecific charging d i ~ c r e t i 0 n . lIndeed,
~~
some prosecutors lack
the training necessary to appreciate even the existence of their
case-specific charging discretion.

(Supp. 1988).
See James Marshall, Lawyers, Truth and the Zero-Sum Game, 47 NOTRE
133.
DAMELAW.919, 921 (1972).
See id. at 922.
134.
135.
See DOUGLASS,
supra note 5, a t v, 34.
See MODELRULES,supra note 4, Rule 1.3 cmt.; MODELCODE,supra note 4,
136.
Canon 7. See also Patterson, supra note 106, a t 519.
137. Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U . PA. L.
REV. 1031, 1050 (1975) [hereinafter Frankel 111.
138.
See DAVIDLUBAN,LAWYERS
AND JUSTICE
90 (1988).
139.
See MARVIN E . FRANKEL,PARTISAN
JUSTICE
22-26 (1980).
140.
R.J. Gerber, Victory vs. Truth: The Adversary System and Its Ethics, 19
A m . ST. L.J. 3, 4 (1987).
141.
See DOUGLASS,
supra note 5, a t 5, 34; Fisher, supra note 11, a t 255-56.
142. JEROME
FRANK & BARBARAFRANK,NOT GUILTY 241-42 (1957); Belsky,
supra note 125, a t 1508-09; Fisher, supra note 11, a t 206, 257. But cf. DOUGLASS,
supra note 5, at 75 (noting an increase in office training of prosecutors in the area
of professional responsibility in recent years).
143.
See JACOBY,
supra note 53, at 15.
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Although variations in prosecutors' offices and in
individual prosecutors make generalizations somewhat
risky,14 many offices seek to accomplish some form of central
control over charging discretion by restricting t h a t
discretion-particularly
the initial screening function-to
experienced, supervisory prosecutor^.'^^ Nevertheless, the
initial charging decision will frequently be made in a matter of
minutes, given the necessity of processing many arrested
individuals through the initial judicial appearance i n a very
short time.'46 This brief case evaluation will typically be
made solely on the basis of information from a police officer
and, if applicable (and then typically only indirectly), from the
victim of the crime.14' The information provided i n this
limited context is not always accurate and complete.'" Under
these circumstances, it is hardly remarkable that the screening
prosecutor is routinely persuaded to file criminal charges.149
Even in cases that present some doubts, the cursory screening
process rarely allows for immediate investigation.lsO
Assuming there is a legal basis for criminal charges, the
"safest" course of action is to file charges and leave the
necessary investigation to the individual line assistant to whom
the case is assigned.
Despite the likelihood that the screening process does not
produce a considered and informed charging decision, a line
assistant may find it easier simply to prosecute the case to
conclusion than to seek reconsideration by a s u p e r v i ~ o r . ' ~ ~
Moreover, some line assistants place unwarranted faith in the
screening process and are consequently unlikely to perceive any
necessity for reevaluation. ls2
This fragmented decision-making is not necessarily limited

144. See Fisher, supra note 11, a t 204. See also Kaplan, supra note 5, at 178.
145. See Alschuler, supra note 129, a t 64 n.42. See also MILLER,supra note 11,
a t 17; Abrams, supra note 34, a t 54.
146. For example, in the United States Attorney's Office in the District of
Columbia, the daily screening process typically involved making charging decisions,
preparing the necessary paperwork, and appearing in court a t the initial judicial
appearance for over 100 cases per day.
147. See GROSMAN,
supra note 52, a t 46-47.
148. David Kamm, Practical Aspects of Prosecution: The Case for the Prosecutor,
13 TOLEDOL. REV. 299, 300 (1982).
149. See Fisher, supra note 11, a t 208.
150.
Cf. MILLER,supra note 11, a t 4.
151. Alschuler, supra note 129, a t 64 n.42.
152. See Felkenes, supra note 6, a t 112-13.
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to the screening function. Many prosecutors' offices, for reasons
of efficiency, employ what can be termed a horizontal case
assignment system.ls3 For example, certain line assistants
may be assigned, for a period of time, exclusively to the
presentation of cases to the grand jury for indictment, while
other line assistants may be assigned exclusively to the trials
of those same cases.'" With such an arrangement, it is easy
for each line assistant to rationalize that any decision to
dismiss charges should have been, or should be, made by
another line assistant a t another stage of the criminal justice
process. In fact, a t least in prosecutors' offices burdened with
large caseloads, detailed investigation and preparation of cases
may not take place until trial is imminent.lss As noted,
however, by that time the earlier screening stages may be
accorded an unjustified deference interfering with objective
evaluation. 156
The possibility that prosecutors will fail to dismiss
appropriate cases is sometimes exacerbated by the motivations
of prosecutors themselves. Some prosecutors have political or
other ambitions,15' and consequently, they are concerned
about their status and advancement within the prosecutors'
office.15' That advancement may often depend upon one's
image of being fearless about prosecuting difficult cases.ls9
Correspondingly, line assistants who seek dismissals because of
doubts concerning the defendants' guilt run the risk of being
perceived as soft, fearful, and lacking the skills to win the
Particularly where cases generate public
tough case?'
attention, the prosecutors' office may be reluctant to appear
ame1iorati~e.l~~
In such cases, there is likely enhanced
pressure upon the assigned line assistant to obtain a
conviction.16'
Even the most conscientious of prosecutors cannot avoid
the effects of very selective influences inherent in the criminal

See Abrams, supra note 34, at 2-6.
Id. at 2.
Bubany & Skillern, supra note 18, at 489.
See supra text accompanying notes 149-150.
DOUGLASS,
supra note 5, at 5; FRANK& FRANK,supra note 142, at 236-37.
See Kaplan, supra note 5, at 180.
See Felkenes, supra note 6, at 112.
See Alschuler, supra note 129, at 64 11.42.
Fisher, supra note 11, at 231; Utz, supra note 116, at 102.
Kaplan, supra note 5, at 181.
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justice process. Prosecutors rarely speak to defendants.
Prosecutors come to know defendants from police reports and
rap sheets, and thus think of defendants only in the context of
the criminal accusations. By contrast, prosecutors may come t o
know victims as real people, possibly likeable people, and very
often persons deserving of consideration and sympathy. Quite
naturally, prosecutors may develop loyalty to victims, and that
loyalty may influence the prosecutors' decisions.'"
Prosecutors also come into prolonged and recurrent contact
with police officers. As a result, prosecutors may tend to regard
police officers as their clients.lB4Thus, some prosecutors may
be reluctant to derail prosecutions, particularly where the
police officers feel strongly about the case.165This may be
true despite the fact that many police officers are satisfied as t o
the defendant's guilt at the time of the arrest, and view all
subsequent procedures as potential occasions for the frustration
of effective law enf0r~ement.l~~
In short, the prosecutor's institutional posture and
orientation make him or her less likely to perceive doubts
concerning the guilt of defendants?' Once an investigation
focuses upon a particular individual, the prosecutor naturally
examines evidence with a predisposition t o confirm his or her
original theory of ~u1pability.l~~
Once the case proceeds t o
trial, it will probably require some truly extraordinary and
unanticipated development to cause the prosecutor to
reevaluate the propriety of seeking a conviction.169And if the
trial prosecutor is in an office which employs a horizontal caseassignment system, he or she may not even be privy t o
information which should have created some doubt at an
earlier stage of the proce~s."~
The result is that even a conscientious prosecutor can come
t o believe, or at least to presume, that all, or virtually all,

163. Kara S. Donahue, Note, Prosecutorial Ethics: The Case for the Per Se Rule,
18 FORDHAM
URB.L.J. 407, 416 (1990-91).
164. Fisher, supra note 11, at 209.
165. See William F. McDonald, !l%eProsecutor's Domain, in THE PROSECUTOR
15,
32-42 (William F. McDonald ed., 11 Sage Criminal Justice System Annuals, 1979);
Kaplan, supra note 5, at 182.
166.
GROSMAN,
supra note 52, at 44-47.
167. E.g., Gross, supra note 120, at 447.
168. Randolph N. Jonakait, The Ethical Prosecutor's Misconduct, 23 CRJM.L.
BULL.550, 552, 559-62 (1987).
169.
Zacharias, supra note 79, at 51.
170. Jonakait, supra note 168, at 553.
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defendants are in fact guilty.17' This conclusion receives
constant reinforcement from the high percentage of dispositions
by guilty pleas17' and the high conviction rate at trial.173
The occasional acquittal can easily be accounted for by the
irrationality of the jury, the bizarre rulings of the trial judge,
or the objectionable tactics of defense counsel. Gradually, the
prosecutor can come to view his or her primary obligation as
obtaining conviction^.'^^ The admonitional obligation to "seek
justice" is forgotten, not because it is ignored, but because
prosecutors equate it with obtaining convictions.
This phenomenon of emphasizing convictions has been
labeled "conviction psychology,"'75 and it is not merely a
theoretical model. Many prosecutors do, in fact, believe their
primary function is to secure conviction^.'^^ Because the
adoption of a conviction psychology frequently results from the
institutional influences brought to bear upon prosecutors,
veteran prosecutors are more likely than their less experienced
colleagues t o manifest conviction psychology.177Nevertheless,
these conviction-oriented values affect the entire office, both
because the values are conveyed to newcomers,178 and
because more experienced prosecutors dominate supervisory
positions where much charging discretion is located.
Needless to say, the assimilation of a conviction psychology
by the prosecutor makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the
prosecutor to protect the innocently accused.179 Overemphasizing convictions can lead to an ends-justifies-the-means
mentality, resulting in various forms of prosecutorial
rniscond~ct.'~~
Because the prosecutor focuses exclusively on
securing the conviction, there is a danger that the prosecutor
will, for example, be improperly reluctant to disclose
exculpatory material to the defenselgl or subtly influence
witnesses' testimony to secure a guilty verdict.lS2
171.
Id. at 553-54; Felkenes, supra note 6, at 110.
172.
Jonakait, supra note 168, a t 553-54.
173.
supra note 142, a t 239.
Id. a t 554. See also FRANK& FRANK,
174.
Felkenes, supra note 6, at 110.
175.
Id.
176.
Id. at 109.
177.
Id. a t 111.
178.
Fisher, supra note 11, a t 206.
179.
See id. at 206; Felkenes, supra note 6, a t 110.
180.
See Fisher, supra note 11, a t 199, 208; Jonakait, supra note 168, a t 550.
181. See, e.g., United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 696-97 (1985) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
Cf. Stephan Landsman, Reforming Adversary Procedure: A Proposal
182.
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Of course, for all litigators, the temptation to engage in
intentional misconduct, as well as the danger of unintended
improprieties, arises from the adversary system's emphasis
upon ~ i c t 0 r y . lIn
~ ~the case of the prosecutor, the emphasis
upon victory inherent in a n adversary ethic not only motivates
potential misconduct, but also steers the prosecutor inexorably
toward a conviction psychology.184 As a result, the adversary
process makes it difficult for the prosecutor to protect the
i~0cent.l~~
The reaction of prosecutors to the behavior of defense
counsel also impacts upon the prosecutofs adoption of a n
adversary ethic. The obligation of defense counsel is primarily,
if not exclusively, to the defendant? Consequently, defense
counsel will seek to advance the causes of truth and
substantive justice only coincidentally, i.e., when those goals
are consistent with the personal interests of the defendant.ls7
With the adoption of an adversary ethic, some prosecutors
advocate extreme positions in an attempt to counterbalance the
position of defense c0unse1.l~Some prosecutors also respond
in kind to defense tactics, feeling that adversary combat cannot
be fought with unequal weaponry.'"
Given all of these influences, it should be clear that a
prosecutor's decision regarding the existence and nature of selfimposed charging standards depends fundamentally upon the
prosecutor's position on the appropriateness of a n adversary
model of prosecutorial behavior. A brief examination of the
adversary system, and its relevance to a prosecutor's ethic, is
thus in order.

IV. THE ADVERSARYMODEL
During my tenure in the United States Attorney's Office in
Concerning the Psychology of Memory and the Testimony of Disinterested Witnesses,
45 U . P I ~ ' L.
. REV.547, 553-56 (1984).
183. See Marshall, supra note 133, a t 921.
184. See Cox, supra note 18, a t 414; Fisher, supra note 11, at 208; Utz, supra
note 116, at 103, 108; Vorenberg I, supra note 8, a t 1557-58.
Cox, supra note 18, a t 415. This is particularly true a t trial, which is an
185.
inherently competitive process. See Zacharias, supra note 79, a t 107-08.
186. See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 11, a t 208 n.53.
& HAGEN,supra note 7, a t 2; Frankel 11, supra note
187. See, e.g., NISSMAN
137, at 1037-38; Uviller, supra note 78, a t 1072-73.
188. See Fisher, supra note 11, a t 252.
~ & FRANK,
K
supra note 142, a t 233-34; Fisher, supra note 11, a t
189. See F
210-11.
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Washington, D.C., it was the practice for trial assistants to
circulate post-trial memoranda to other trial assistants. These
memoranda would detail the charges, the verdict and the jury
members,lgOas well as comments from the assistant who
tried the case. I recall receiving such a memorandum from a
friend and colleague reporting on an acquittal, in which he
commented that he believed that the jury's verdict was correct.
Of course, no one would enjoy confessing to losing a case that
should have been won, but I knew the author of the
memorandum well enough to doubt that his comment was
made merely to insulate his ego and prestige. I remember
wondering, given his view of the case, how he would have felt if
he had obtained a conviction, and I asked him that very
question. He responded that he would have felt just fine, thank
you, because it was the jury's province to decide guilt or
innocence. In fact, he added, it would have been improper for
him to interfere with the jury's prerogative by dismissing the
case.
Had we been representing private clients, there could be no
quarrel with my colleague's position. It summarized the
essence of the adversary system: it is not for litigants' counsel
to duplicate the function of the trier of fact. Indeed, such
duplication is not only not required; it is not permitted. It is
somehow seen as intrusive upon the exclusive province of the
trier of fact. Like presumptively selecting from the menu for
one's date without leave to do so, it is simply not done.
I n the context of a prosecutor, who does not represent a
private client, the same ethic prevails in some circles. Some
prosecutors insist that the prosecutor's obligation is to leave
the question of guilt or innocence to the jury.lgl Even when
the prosecutor has doubts about the defendant's guilt or
concerning the truth of the government's evidence, the jury
must make the factual d e ~ i s i 0 n . l ~ ~

190.
Because jurors would serve for several weeks, it was useful to know, during
jury selection, whether potential jurors had returned a guilty or not guilty verdict,
and the circumstances in which they did so, earlier in their term.
191.
See, e-g., Uviller, supra note 85, at 1155-59.
192.
See Harvey A. Schneider & Stephen D. Marks, The Contrasting Ethical
Duties of the Prosecutor and Defense Attorney in Criminal Cases, 7 U. WESTL.A.
L. REV. 120, 126 (1975). Some advocates of the adversary model of prosecutorial
behavior assert, however, that a prosecutor should not prosecute where "there is a
substantial likelihood that the defendant is innocent." Uviller, supra note 85, at
1159.

PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION
This position stems from an unfounded faith in the
adversary system. Many who defend the adversary system tout
it as a superior process for discovering the truth.lg3For some
the adversary system has become not merely a means to that
end, but rather a glorified end in and of itself.lg4 On this
view, lawyers are servants to the system, and it is essential
that they fulfill their function as advocates and not seek to
perform roles the system assigns t o other functionaries.
Those who apply this ethic to prosecutors believe prosecutors should identify themselves as advocates for the
community "other than the defendant."lg5Thus, because the
prosecutor functions in an adversary system against an
advocate for the defendant, he or she has an advocate's duty to
present the doubtful case in the strongest possible way against
the defendant.lg6The prosecutor's function is not to determine truth, as he or she has no special abilities t o perform that
function.lg7In short, prosecutors are not merely permitted to
rely on the process, they are required to defer to it.lg8
But why such faith in the adversary system? It is true that
the adversary system is an integral component of a dispute
resolution process designed to ascertain the truth.lgg At best,
however, we just assume that the adversary system is a
and at worst we engage
valuable contributor t o this

See, e.g., Marvin E. Frankel, From Private Fights Toward Public Justice, 51
193.
N.Y.U. L. REV. 516, 517 (1976) [hereinafter Frankel I]; Frankel 11, supra note 137,
a t 1052; Gary Goodpaster, The Adversary System, Advocacy, and Effective
Assistance of Counsel in Criminal Cases, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE59, 68
(1986); Stark, supra note 73, a t 971; Uviller, supra note 78, a t 1067; Zacharias,
supra note 79, a t 53.
LAWYER'SCODE OF CONDUCT,
Preamble (Roscoe
194. See, e.g., THE AMERICAN
Pound-Am. Trial Lawyers Found. Revised Draft 1982) (referring to the adversary
system as a system which "helps to preserve and enhance our dignity as
individuals" and a s an "express[ion] [of] fundamental American values," and
extolling "all American lawyers" to commit "to strengthening that system as the
embodiment of the constitutional values inherent in the administration of justice in
the United States"). See also LUBAN,supra note 138, a t 58 ("[Tlhere is a tendency
among many people to treat reservations about the adversary system a s assaults
on the American Way.").
195.
Stephen A. Saltzburg, Lawyers, Clients, and the Adversary System, 37
MERCERL. REV. 647, 665 (1986).
196.
See Fisher, supra note 11, a t 231.
197. See id.; Uviller, supra note 78, a t 1079.
198.
Cf. Uviller, supra note 78, at 1078; Uviller, supra note 85, a t 1158-59.
199. See, e.g., Tehan v. United states a rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966).
200.
Cfi Gary Goodpaster, On The Theory of American Adversary Criminal Trial,
78 J. CRIM.L. & CRIMINOLOGY
118, 118 (1987).
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i n self-deception or even hypocrisy in proclaiming the truthrevealing virtues of our adversarial process.201
The fact is that, because we do not know "the truth" in any
absolute sense, we cannot measure the truth-revealing
capabilities of the adversary system except on the basis of
anecdotal accounts and intuition.202But the idea that trial by
combat, whatever the weapons, will reliably produce truth is
both counter-intuitive203 and contradicted by experience.204
Certainly the parties and their advocates are not pursuing the
truth; they are pursuing
As trial lawyers and
judges are likely to acknowledge, "the fairness of the
procedures is not a guarantee of the truth-finding capacity of
trials."206 False testimony is sometimes believed, and
accurate testimony is sometimes rejected?'? Thus, in the
view of critics of the adversary system, truth can only result as
a coincidental byproduct of the process,"08 and consequently,
truth is a n insufficiently valued and not necessarily attained
objective of the process.209
The impact of lawyers upon the process cannot be
overstated. Verdicts, especially those of juries, are sometimes
influenced by the divergent skills, and sometimes even
personalities, of the advocates?1° A skillful lawyer can
frequently create the appearance that a perfectly honest and
accurate witness is confused or even lying.211Consistent with
legal and ethical requirements, skillful lawyers can block the
presentation of truthful and accurate evidence.212 Indeed,

201.
Frankel 11, supra note 137, at 1036, 1039.
Saltzburg, supra note 195, at 655. See also LUBAN,supra note 138, a t 68.
202.
203.
LUBAN,supra note 138, at 70; Goodpaster, supra note 193, a t 64; Zacharias,
supra note 79, at 55.
Frankel 11, supra note 137, at 1034.
204.
205.
See Frankel 11, supra note 137, a t 1035; Goodpaster, supra note 193, a t 71
& n.66; Goodpaster, supra note 200, a t 122, 124.
206.
Goodpaster, supra note 200, a t 129.
207.
See, e.g., Richard Eggleston, What Is Wrong with the Adversary System?, 49
AUSTL.L.J. 428, 431 (1975).
208.
See Frankel 11, supra nt te 137, a t 1037.
209.
See, e.g., Frankel 11, supra note 137, a t 1032; Gerber, supra note 140, a t 4.
See also Saltzburg, supra note 195, a t 651; Stark, supra note 73, a t 972.
210.
See FRANK& FRANK, supra note 142, a t 231; Frankel I, supm note 193, at
518; Gerber, supra note 140, a t 5; Goodpaster, supra note 193, a t 59.
& FRANK, supra note 142, a t 227; Eggleston, supra note 207, at
211.
See FRANK
431-32; Frankel 11, supra note 137, a t 1048.
212.
See LUBAN,supra note 138, a t 57; Frankel I, supra note 193, a t 519;
Frankel 11, supra note 137, at 1038; Patterson, supra note 106, a t 524.
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such amoral skills are admired by members of the bench and
bar213and highly sought after by inexperienced lawyers and
students.
Additionally, while the adversary system assumes equal
competence of the opposing advocates,214this is frequently
not the case.215Particularly in criminal cases, the ability of
the adversarial system t o produce a just result is dubious
where defense counsel lacks comparable skill and dedication to
that of the prosecutor.216I have had the simultaneous
pleasure and difficulty of encountering some extremely talented
and dedicated criminal defense lawyers as adversaries, but that
was certainly not always the case. Assigned counsel, in
particular, include some of the best and worst of the defense
bar.217 Unfortunately, the extent of inadequate criminal
defense representation is not insignificant.21g
The corollary of this phenomenon is the proposition that a
superior performance by a prosecutor can enhance the prospect
of conviction, quite independent of the merits of the case.219
In fact, prosecutors sometimes take advantage of inferior
adversaries to accomplish results not otherwise attainable.220
And, under an adversary model, there is no incentive for
prosecutors t o rescue defendants from the inadequacies of
defense counsel.221
See Frankel 11, supra note 137, a t 1034.
213.
David L. Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U . CIN. L. REV. 1,
214.
2 (1973); Murray L. Schwartz, The Zeal of the Civil Advocate, 1983 AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 543, 547 (1983).
215.
Schwartz, supra note 214, at 547.
216.
Goodpaster, supra note 193, a t 65; Zacharias, supra note 79, a t 66.
217.
Kaplan, supra note 5, a t 187.
See Bazelon, supra note 214, a t 2; Warren E. Burger, The Special Skills of
218.
Advocacy: Are Specialized Training and Certification of Advocates Essential to Our
System of Justice?, 42 FORDHAM
L. REVIEW227, 227 (1973); Goodpaster, supra note
193, at 72-73. Judge Bazelon characterizes some assigned counsel as "courthouse
regulars" who lack the motivation to make more than perfunctory efforts for
limited fees, "uptown lawyers" who specialize in other areas of the law and accept
appointments only out of a sense of duty, and "neophytes" who have no experience
in any area of the law. Bazelon, supra note 214, a t 8-13. By contrast, although
many prosecutors are inexperienced, they do quickly gather specialized experience
in the criminal area, and a lack of motivation is a n infrequent problem.
219.
See Zacharias, supra note 79, at 52 & 11.27.
220.
See FREEDMANI, supra note 12, at 88-89; Bazelon, supra note 214, a t 15.
See also Kaplan, supra note 5, a t 186 (suggesting that, in certain circumstances,
prosecutors are more likely to bring criminal charges if they know the defendant is
represented by unskilled counsel).
221.
See Bazelon, supra note 214, a t 15. From an adversarial perspective, the
only concern a prosecutor should have is that the defendant's conviction will be
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Insofar as the justification for a system of dispute
resolution is the discovery of truth, perhaps the best defense of
the adversary system is that there appear to be no superior
alternative^.^^ Indeed, whatever one thinks of the adversary
system, i t is here to stay.223 But even assuming that the
adversary system is a superior system for guiding the private
practitioner, it does not necessarily follow that it is a valuable
standard for prosecutorial behavior. The adversary system that
prosecutors must accept as governing the world in which they
function is not necessarily what they should embrace a s their
professional ethic.
I n fact, some rationales for the adversary system have
little or no application to the prosecutor. For example, one view
of the adversary system is that it permits the clients to
participate in the dispute resolution process.224 Prosecutors
do not have private clients, and thus this rationale is not
applicable to the government in criminal prosecutions.'*
Another rationale frequently offered for the adversary
system-particularly in the context of criminal defense-is that
it functions in conjunction with the attorney-client privilege to
foster unrestrained communication between defendants and
their l a ~ y e r s . " ~Again, because prosecutors do not represent
private clients, this rationale is not applicable to them.227
overturned because of ineffective assistance of counsel. In Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Court imposed upon defendants advancing such claims the
dual burden of establishing, first, that counsel's performance was so defective as to
overcome a strong presumption of competence, id. a t 688, 696, and second, that the
defendant was prejudiced to the extent that there was a reasonable probability
that the outcome would have been different but for counsel's errors, id. a t 691-92,
694. This standard makes it very difficult for defendants to advance successful
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. See, e.g., Goodpaster, supra note 193, a t
73. Correspondingly, this standard creates a very high threshold before adversarial
prosecutors will become concerned that the ineffectiveness of defense counsel will
jeopardize convictions.
222.
See LUBAN,supra note 138, a t 68, 92.
223.
See Uviller, supra note 78, a t 1074.
224.
See Stark, supra note 73, a t 972.
225.
But see Fisher, supra note 11, at 231. Professor Fisher suggests that one
justification for prosecutors to adopt an adversarial ethic is that i t permits
witnesses to "get their day in court." Id. However, witnesses, even if they are
victims of crimes, are not parties to criminal prosecutions. Moreover, in my
experience, only a small percentage of witnesses for the government actually desire
to testify; most are at best dutifully compliant. Finally, the disposition of the
majority of criminal prosecutions by plea agreements limits Professor Fisher's
rationale to a small percentage of cases.
226.
See FREEDMAN
I, supra note 12, a t 79.
Id.
227.
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So what is a prosecutor to do? In the absence of any
significant external constraints upon the exercise of charging
discretion,228in the face of a variety of self-imposed standards
available from which to c h o o ~ ewith
~ ~ the realization that
certain institutional and psychological factors will inevitably
push him or her t o a conviction orientation,230and with the
comprehension that all lawyers function in a system with an
overarching adversarial ethic:31 what should a prosecutor
adopt as his or her own charging standard? Some
recommendations follow in the next part of this article.

It is often said that the prosecutor serves a dual role,
functioning both as an advocate for the government and as an
administrator of justice.232 The prosecutor is assigned both
the quasi-judicial role of protecting the innocent and the
advocate's role of pursuing conviction^.^^ This presents the
prosecutor with difficult questions in attempting to assign and
b dance these apparently conflicting roles
Some have suggested that each of these roles assumes
prominence at different stages of the criminal process, with the
prosecutor exercising a judicial role in determining whether o r
not to prosecute, and thereafter functioning as a zealous
advocate in a quest for convictions.235Such a theory may
have some descriptive value regarding the behavior of some
prosecutors, but there is surely no reason why the prosecutor's
obligation to "seek justice" should disappear once the defendant
has been charged.2s6Additional information may come t o the
prosecutor's attention in the serious preparation that occurs

.

See discussion supra part I.
228.
See discussion supra part 11.
229.
See discussion supra part 111.
230.
See discussion supra part IV.
231.
See, e.g., MODELRULES, supra note 4, Rule 3.8 cmt.; ABA PROSECUTION
232.
supra note 76, Standard 3-l.l(b); Edwards, supra note 5, at 511;
STANDARDS,
Frampton, supra note 60, at 7; Fuller & Randall, supra note 3, at 1218; Vorenberg
I, supra note 8, at 1557; Donahue, supra note 163, at 407.
supra note 142, at 233-34; NISSMAN
& HAGEN,supra note
FRANK& FRANK,
233.
7, at 2; Edwards, supra note 5, at 511; Fisher, supra note 11, at 216; Frampton,
supra note 60, at 7; Zacharias, supra note 79, at 107.
234.
Fisher, supra note 11, at 217; Vorenberg I, supra note 8, at 1557.
Whitney N. Seymour, Jr., Why Prosecutors Act Like Prosecutors, 11 REC.
235.
AsS'N B. CITY N.Y.302, 312-13 (1956).
236.
Fisher, supra note 11, at 224-26.
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immediately before trial, or even during the trial itself. Indeed,
t h e Model Code describes t h e ethical prosecutor's
nonadversarial function as extending to the trial itself.237
In the absence of such a simplistic solution, the prosecutor
is left with an ongoing schizophrenia, acting simultaneously as
an advocate and a minister of justice. As a result, the
prosecutor is faced with a dilemma. He or she must determine
which role will take priority. While this dilemma is often
confronted in a n issue-specific fashion, it manifests itself more
fundamentally in the prosecutor's perception of his or her
primary role as either a judicial officer or as a law enforcement
advocate.2s8 The overarching ethical prescription of zealous
advocacy tends to create the latter self-image,23gan image
which is constantly reinforced by the forces of the adversary
criminal pro~ess.~"
But even if one assumes that the prosecutor is primarily a
zealous advocate, there is still a question as to the identity of
the prosecutor's client. Prosecutors do not have individual,
identifiable clients.241They are lawyers for the state. As such,
prosecutors represent the public interest.242 Prosecutors
represent the interests of society as a whole, including the
interests of defendants as members of that
But
without direction from a specific client, the prosecutor must
make the client's decisions; the prosecutor must define the
public interest in specific cases.2M
If prosecutors truly accept their obligation to define the
public interest they represent, the apparent conflict between
zealous advocacy on behalf of the state and "seeking justice"
disappears. Neither the state nor the public interest is served if
237.
MODELCODE,supra note 4, EC 7-13 (For the text of this section, see supra
note 75.).
See Jay A. Sigler, The Prosecutor: A Comparative Functional Analysis, in
238.
THE PROSECUTOR
53, 55 (William F. McDonald ed., 11 Sage Criminal Justice
System Annuals, 1979) (reporting that of 36 prosecutors responding to
questionnaires, 15 regarded themselves as judicial officers, 14 regarded themselves
a s law enforcement officers, and 7 regarded themselves as independent of both the
judiciary and the executive).
239.
See Zacharias, supra note 79, at 52.
240.
See supra text accompanying notes 141-189.
241.
Prosecutors do not represent particular individuals, including crime victims
or police officers. Corrigan, supm note 78, a t 537; Kress, supra note 25, a t 107.
242.
See DOUGLASS,
supra note 5, at 31; Edwards, supra note 5, a t 511.
243.
NISSMAN& HAGEN,supra note 7, at 7; Corrigan, supra note 78, at 538-39.
244.
See MODELCODE,supra note 4, EC 7-13. Cf. Fisher, supra note 11, at 22023.
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the innocent are convicted.245 Thus, prosecutors who
indiscriminately seek convictions violate not only the "seek
justice" prong of their ethical obligation; they violate the
"zealous advocacy" prong as well. Zealous advocacy must be on
behalf of the client's interest, and the only legitimate interest
of the prosecutor's client is assuring that justice is done.
Characterizing the prosecutor's obligation as a dual onerepresenting the state and "seeking justice"-suggests that the
state has some interest other than justice. But this is only true
if the prosecutor defines society's interests more broadly than
the accomplishment of justice. However, if the prosecutor
properly focuses upon the interests of society as nothing more
nor less than "seeking justice," then the obligation of the
prosecutor is singular and clear: it is t o accomplish justice by
prosecuting only the
The admonition to "seek justice" is meaninglessly
redundant if it means only that the prosecutor is prohibited
from violating other, specific ethical rules.247The task for the
prosecutor-is to give content t o the "seek justice" admonition.
Unfortunately, the dual-obligation formula for prosecutorial
behavior minimizes the content of the "seek justice" prong by
juxtaposing it with the "zealous advocacy" prong.
In truth, the prosecutor is instructed t o "seek justice," not
as a check upon his or her advocacy, but rather as a direction
for its exercise. The prosecutor is commanded, by virtue of the
interests he or she represents, to discriminate among those
who may suffer the consequences of formal criminal accusation
and possible conviction. The prosecutor, like it or not,
determines the fate of many individuals accused of crimes,248
and thus, the conscientious prosecutor is the best protection
against unjust accusations and convictions.249
The potential, dire consequences-even
short of conviction-to the wrongfully accused have already been touched
upon.250But the most unthinkable injustice-the conviction of
an innocent individual-must surely be unacceptable t o the
conscientious prosecutor.251Yet cases exist where this has
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

Jonakait, supra note 168, at 551; Saltzburg, supra note 195, at 665.
See Zacharias, supm note 79, at 50.
Fisher, supra note 11, at 218-19.
Vorenberg I, supra note 8, at 1522.
Corrigan, supra note 78, at 537.
See supra text accompanying notes 10-16.
Cf. Corrigan, supra note 78, at 540.
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occurred.252Such occurrences may be rare, but it is naive to
believe that such cases do not go undetected and uncorrected.
The fallibility of the human actors in the process-from
witnesses t o jurors-makes such possibilities real. Indeed, the
burden placed upon the government to prove guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt is a tacit acknowledgement of both the
gravity and plausibility of erroneous convictions.253
If the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard is a necessary
cushion against erroneous convictions by the trier of fact, then
how can prosecutors, in pursuit of their obligation to "seek
justice," impose any lower standard upon themselves?
Prosecutors do not serve the interests of society by pursuing
cases where the prosecutors themselves have reasonable doubts
as to the factual guilt of the defendant^.^" There is surely no
reason to believe the jury is better able to determine guilt or
innocence than the prosecutor.255The jury system may be the
best available alternative for determining guilt or innocence at
trial, but it does not follow that we must suffer delusions about
the jury's unassailable reliability.256Prosecutors routinely
report, at least privately, on jury error following acquittals.
There is nothing to justify the extraordinary trust prosecutors
place in those same juries when prosecutors pursue cases as to
which the prosecutors themselves have reasonable
The unacceptability of deferring to the jury is further
manifested by the fact that only a small percentage of cases
actually proceed to trial. Most cases are disposed of by guilty
pleas. Indeed, a dominant factor in prosecutorial discretion is
the need t o dispose of
and the primary vehicle to
accomplish that end is plea bargaining. The same prosecutors
who would defer to the jury the scrutiny of determining guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt are simultaneously frustrating the
And
jury's prerogative by disposing of cases prior to
252.
See FRANK & FRANK, supra note 142, a t 31.
253.
Goldstein, supra note 56, at 1153; Saltzburg, supra note 195, a t 655.
254.
Corrigan, supra note 78, a t 540.
255.
Gross, supra note 120, at 446.
256.
See Kamm, supra note 148, a t 303.
257.
This is especially troubling given the fact that jurors sometimes trust and
defer to prosecutors, and assume that prosecutors have determined-perhaps on the
basis of additional information not available to the jury-that
the defendant is
guilty. See Gross, supra note 120, at 448. Thus, it is entirely possible that both
the prosecutor and the jury will have deferred, a t least in part, to the presumed
independent determination of guilt made by the other.
258.
Cox, supra note 18, a t 391.
259.
See FREEDMAN I , supra note 12, at 86-88; Alschuler, supra note 129, at 63-

.
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because the "generosity" of plea offers is normally greatest in
the cases with the least likelihood of producing convictions at
the greatest pressures to plead guilty will fall on
those defendants who may be
Prosecutors who, in
their zeal to dispose of weak cases, offer seductive incentives to
plead guilty while failing to satisfy themselves beyond a
reasonable doubt of defendants' guilt are ignoring the danger of
producing erroneous convictions in violation of their prime
ethical directive.262
For all of these reasons, the conscientious prosecutor, in
zealous pursuit of society's interest in justice, does not and
should not pursue cases unless personally satisfied beyond a
But a prosecutor
reasonable doubt of the defendants'
need not come to this conclusion exclusively within the
adversary model. In other words, while this conclusion can be
derived from an identification of the legitimate interests of
society as the prosecutor's client, many prosecutors more
faithfully attain the goal of "seeking justice" by rejecting the
adversary model entirely.
It is true that the prosecutor functions in an adversary
system and is opposed by lawyers zealously advocating the
private interests of their clients. It is also true that prosecution
is not for the diffident. But simply because one must have
adversarial skills to function effectively does not mean that one
must adopt an adversary ethic. We rarely think of trial judges
as adversaries, but they surely exercise adversarial skills,
persuading lawyers and parties to perform certain tasks in
certain ways, and defending their decisions from appellate
reversal by the adversarial skills exercised in crafting their
64; Vorenberg I, supra note 8, at 1556.
260. See Utz, supra note 116, at 108.
I, supra note 12, at 87; Alschuler, supra note 129, a t 60.
261.
FREEDMAN
262. See Alschuler, supra note 129, a t 62.
11, supra note 12, at 219.
263.
FREEDMANI, supra note 12, at 85; FREEDMAN
Professor Freedman has also advocated an ethical proscription, to be enforced with
disciplinary sanctions, against prosecutors who "proceed[] with a prosecution if a
fair-minded person could not reasonably conclude, on the facts known to the
11,
prosecutor, that the accused is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." FREEDMAN
supra note 12, a t 221. The wisdom of imposing the "beyond a reasonable doubt"
standard upon prosecutors in the form of a disciplinary rule is at least
questionable, as Professor Freedman has acknowledged. Id. at 221-22. Such a rule
would likely expose prosecutors to disciplinary sanctions in every case which
resulted in an acquittal, possibly discouraging prosecutors from pursuing difficult
but meritorious cases, and also possibly influencing judges to be more reluctant to
grant motions for judgments of acquittal. Id.
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opinions. All of this is perfectly acceptable provided the judges
are objective and fair in their decision-making.
The prosecutor, too, must exercise considerable adversarial
skills, but this cannot justify assuming less than an objective
posture in exercising charging discretion. The law defines guilt
as that which is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. If
prosecutors pursue cases without satisfying themselves beyond
a reasonable doubt of the defendants' guilt, they are asking the
jury to do what the prosecutors would not do themselves. This
is the essence of the adversary function.2B4But this is surely
unacceptable if the prosecutor's mission is fairly and objectively
to expose only the guilty to criminal sanctions.265
Ultimately, the question prosecutors must ask themselves
is whether they wish to function as ministers of justice, o r
merely as ministers of process. For many prosecutors, functioning merely as a cog in the criminal justice system is quite
simply an inadequate return on their commitment. Trusting
solely in the criminal justice system t o protect the innocent-in
the face of convincing evidence of that system's inability to do
so in all cases-is too great a concession to the adversary model
of behavior, a model that takes its origin and justification from
the very different circumstances of the lawyer representing a
private client.
Rather than mischaracterizing the public prosecutor as an
adversary with additional, conflicting obligations, it would be
more accurate and beneficial for prosecutors t o view themselves
as skilled adversaries exercising quasi-judicial functions. The
accomplishment of justice should not be the fortuitous residue
of the process in which the prosecutor participates; it should be
the guiding principle for every aspect of the prosecutorid
function. The prosecutor must accept personal responsibility for
the accomplishment of justice, and the fundamental aspect of
this imperative is that the prosecutor must refuse to accept the
risk of conviction of individuals when the prosecutor has
reasonable doubts as to their

264.
See supra notes 191-198 and accompanying text.
265.
See Corrigan, supra note 78, at 541.
266.
In my tenure as a prosecutor, the issue materialized on several occasions,
but the following situation stands clearly in my recollection. The victim, a short,
handicapped gentleman in his late fifties, was working in his backyard under his
car. Two men approached him, exhibited handguns, and took the victim into his
otherwise unoccupied house. Once inside, the two men robbed and gratuitously beat
the victim, shot him and left, apparently believing the victim to be dead. A

PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION
As discussed earlier, many prosecutors are drawn to the
quasi-judicial role of the prosecutor precisely because of qualms
about the adversary function of lawyers for private clients.267
But many do not share those qualms. And all prosecutors are
subjected to influences which naturally steer them to a
conviction psychology and a n advocate's role.268 Thus, if
prosecutors' offices are serious about the quasi-judicial ethic of
the prosecutor, it is necessary that prosecutors be oriented to
that view.26g Only when prosecutors are encouraged and
trained to assume fully their obligation to seek justice will the
best protection against unjust charges and convictions be fully

neighbor found the victim alive, an ambulance was called, and the victim
ultimately survived following surgery and a two-week hospitalization. Prior to his
emergency surgery, the victim described the two men, in relevant part, as being
about 5'5" to 5'8" tall and in their late twenties. He also claimed to have seen one
of the men playing basketball in the neighborhood prior to the crime.
About one month after the crime, with the investigation having thus far
produced nothing tangible, the victim telephoned the police and reported that one
of the two assailants was at that moment playing basketball a t an outdoor
basketball court in the victim's neighborhood. The police rushed to the
neighborhood, the victim pointed out the defendant as one of his assailants, and
the police arrested the defendant, a 17 year old male standing about six feet tall.
The case was screened and approved by a senior prosecutor. Another prosecutor
presented the case to the grand jury and obtained an indictment. The case was
then assigned to me for trial.
I spoke to the victim on three separate occasions. In his own mind, his
identification was unshakable. He dismissed his earlier descriptions as erroneous,
claiming, quite credibly, that he could not remember his prior descriptions because
of his medical distress at the time. He insisted that the prior descriptions were
inaccurate for the same reason. He claimed a vivid memory of the crime and his
two assailants, and described the event and the assailants in impressive detail. He
would have made an excellent witness.
After a couple of nearly sleepless nights and a great deal of uncertainty, I
persuaded my supervisor that we should dismiss the case. Two fads which I have
not yet mentioned influenced my decision. First, the defendant had no criminal or
juvenile convictions or arrests. This crime was heinous. It seemed most unlikely
that an individual who could commit such a crime would not have a track record
of escalating criminality. Second, the defendant was assigned a lawyer whom I
regarded as minimally effective.
The case was not a strong one for the government, but it could have been won.
But it was winning that frightened me. Ironically, the weakness of defense counsel
made me even more reluctant about pursuing a conviction. Ultimately, my own
reasonable doubts about the defendant's guilt, doubts which my supervisor shared,
or at least endorsed, resulted in the dismissal.
The victim, as you might imagine, was extremely displeased. The defendant
may well have been factually guilty. The adversary process was circumvented. And,
in my view, justice was done.
267.
See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text.
268.
See discussion supra part 111.
269.
Fisher, supra note 11, at 257.
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effective."' The prosecutor must appreciate that his or her
obligation is to investigate as fully and objectively as
possible.271 The prosecutor, especially in a horizontal caseassignment system, must accept the duty continually to
reevaluate cases and reconsider charging decisions where
a p p r ~ p r i a t e . ~And
~ ' the prosecutor must be on constant watch
that his or her advocate's instincts do not interfere with the
singular goal of accomplishing justice.273
VI. CONCLUSION
Prosecutorial discretion has recently been targeted as a n
abuse which needs to be restrained.274 But any such abuses
are not inherent in the exercise of prosecutorial di~cretion.''~
Indeed, one of the greatest dangers to the accomplishment of
justice is the failure of prosecutors to accept the extent and
significance of their discretion. Charging discretion, a t least in
the context of case-specific evaluations, is both unavoidable and
desirable.
In the exercise of their charging discretion, prosecutors
must make a fundamental choice about how they view
themselves and their roles. In order to hlfill their obligation to
seek justice, prosecutors must shed the adversary ethic
reserved for the private interest lawyer and impose upon
themselves the simultaneous duty and freedom to prosecute
only those who are, to the prosecutors' satisfaction, guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.

270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.

See FRANK& FRANK,supra note 142, at 32.
Edwards, supra note 5, at 519.
Corrigan, supra note 78, at 541.
See Fisher, supra note 11, at 201.
See supra notes 25-32 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Utz, supra note 116, at 119.

